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Abstract  
A structured review of the supply chain and risk management literature supports an 
analysis of the sources and types of risks anticipated in supply chains and networks. We 
discuss alternative modelling approaches, such as Bayesian Belief Nets (BBN), System 
Dynamics, Fault and Event Trees, which are evaluated against the criteria characterizing 
systemic risks that emerge from the literature review. Finally, we briefly present an 
empirical pilot case study is conducted with a public sector organization in charge of a 
pharmaceutical distribution network to explore the feasibility of a BBN modelling 
approach. 
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Introduction 
As noted by a growing number of authors (for instance, Jüttner, Peck & Christopher 
(2003), Trkman & McCormack, 2009), risk management is an important contributor to 
operations management in general, and supply chain management in particular. 
Increasingly complex supply chains and networks provide greater opportunities for risk 
events, especially rare events arising due to dependencies within the system that may 
have a low probability of occurrence but high consequence. However, the risk 
management processes commonly advocated in the academic literature are based on 
classification taxonomies that assume independent events. (The references given above 
are quite representative in that respect.) Such theoretical classifications provide a logical 
rationale for the risk registers used in practice. The limitations of risk registers and the 
naivety of not considering dependencies are acknowledged in related area such as 
project risk management and technical risk analysis (see, for instance, Williams, 2002). 
In these domains the importance of systemic risk is established. Therefore the purpose 
of this paper is to explore if, and how, models can be developed to support identification 
and assessment of risks, including their dependencies, to inform their management. In 
particular our objectives are: (1) to examine the nature of systemic risks in supply 
chains; (2) to compare theoretical approaches to modelling systemic dependencies 
between risks; and (3) to explore the practical feasibility of modelling dependent risks 
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The assessment of risks 
Although the process of managing risk will vary between organizations and objectives, 
there are a common set of principles. Figure 1 illustrates one representation of these 
principles. 
 
Figure 1 – The risk management process 
(Source: A Risk Management Standard, published by IRM, ALARM, AIRMI, 2002) 
 
Each stage in the process is necessary for effective management of risks. For 
example, the overall objectives of risk management must be consistent with the overall 
strategic goals and responsibilities of the organization to be effective and add value. The 
reporting and monitoring of risks are required to provide visibility of the key 
weaknesses so that actions can be planned and implemented as required to remove or 
mitigate risks. Risk documentation should allow for updating as new information comes 
available from monitoring of known risks and identification of the possible new risks 
corresponding to observed events or to anticipate events arising from changes in the 
organization or its operations. 
The stage of assessing risks is core to the management process. Risk assessment 
involves identifying and estimating risks to support effective evaluation. The resource 
required to capture and estimate risks is non-trivial but worth the investment if it 
provides good quality data and analysis that can help an organization anticipate 
weaknesses and hence plan appropriately. For example, the identification of risks 
should be conducted by relevant groups of stakeholders who understand the aspect of 
the operations under consideration because they are the individuals who are able to 
identify potential risks for which valid and reliable data are required if value is to be 
generated by the analysis. The resource required to support risk identification and 
estimation (essentially data collection and analysis) will increase as the boundaries and 
the level of operational detail increases. Consequently, the relative proportion of the risk 
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management budget allocated to the assessment stage will also grow as the complexity 
and scale of the operations increases because the absolute cost of the supporting 
processes (such as reporting) will be, to all extents and purposes, fixed. 
Typically, the risk management literature and standards suggest relatively naïve 
approaches to gathering data about potential risks and estimating their effects. For 
example, there tends to be a focus on completing a data sheet which captures data about 
the description of the risk, the nature of its impact, a probability estimate, a severity 
rating and some aggregate measure of risk importance. A method such as Failure Modes 
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) might be used, and the data collected compiled as part of 
a Risk Register, which provides a convenient approach to managing the associated 
bureaucracy. The implication is that such approaches only allow single independent 
risks to be articulated with consequences for the coverage of all risks (as systemic 
dependent events may not be captured) and the estimation of their likelihood and 
impact. 
There are multiple reasons for the simple approaches advocated for risk assessment. 
For example, the focus on the supporting elements of the risk management process 
including the construction of documentation such as Risk Registers in order to manage 
what is a complex activity where breadth rather than depth of coverage is emphasized. 
Another reason might be a lack of integration between the management and the 
modelling of risk which may have been more prevalent in a supply chain operational 
context than in others. In other areas, such as technical risk assessment, the role of 
modelling is more developed bringing benefits in terms of the value of information 
about potential risks due to better controlled data collection and analysis. 
 
The importance of risk modelling 
Ultimately a risk management process seeks to anticipate the risks that might be 
realized in future operations. The goal is to develop a method for perfectly identifying 
all risks, although realistically this may not be possible. Table 1 shows the different 
categories of risk status (known or unknown) from the perspectives of anticipating 
potential risks and the true state of the operational system.  
 
Table 1 – Types of knowledge about adverse events 
 Actual outcome of the event 
Known Unknown 
 
Potential occurrence 
of an adverse event 
Known ‘Known-knowns’ 
(focus on complexity 
of interactions) 
‘Known-unknowns’ 
(focus on aleatoric uncertainty 
and complexity of interactions) 
Unknown Denial or groupthink? ‘Unknown-unknowns’ 
(focus on epistemic uncertainty) 
 
The added-value of good quality data collection is that we can move from simply 
identifying the ‘known-knowns’ (e.g. possible bias if people simply anchor on past 
observable events) to capture the ‘known-unknowns’ (e.g. creating future scenarios in 
which people think through possible hazards to an operation). A poor data collection 
process would fail to identify known risks, maybe by omission or maybe because of an 
expert or management bias (e.g. where it is believed that a management change will 
prevent future occurrences as a result of goal-seeking bias). Even with a good data 
collection process there may be some, so-called, ‘unknown-unknowns’. The monitoring 
stage will allow the risk process to update if any information about these emerges. The 
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goal of good data collection is to minimise the chance of missing the unknown-
unknowns.  
Modelling can support the identification and estimation of risk by providing a lens 
through which the operational system can be viewed. According to Mitchell (1993) a 
model can have two types of role: a model can represent a statement of beliefs and 
assumptions; or a model can be used as a device for prediction. In the former role, the 
model will help for the beliefs by forcing stakeholders to think through important details 
and gain shared understanding, while in the latter role a model will help focus beliefs to 
select problem-solving actions by translating real world inputs into outputs. There is 
scope for both types of modelling in risk management because the process of building 
the model is equivalent to the collection of data to identify and think through the impact 
of potential risks, while the constructed model then becomes a device which can be used 
to estimate or predict the effects of those risks on system operation or the organization. 
There are obvious resource constraints on model building, for example, the time, 
costs and staff expertise required. Recognizing the trade-offs to be made between the 
scope and depth of the model required to support decisions, Phillips (1984) introduces 
the concept of requisite modelling which aspires to develop models that are fit-for-
purpose. The classification of model dimensions given by Mitchell (1993) (e.g. 
actuality-abstraction, black-box-structural, off the shelf-purpose built, absolute-relative, 
passive- behavioural, private-public, part of system – whole system) provides a useful 
framework for positioning the type of modelling required for a given situation. 
In the context of supply chain risk, there is opportunity for, and examples of, 
different types of models (e.g. Discrete Event Simulation, System Dynamics, Bayesian 
Belief Networks) being used in different ways (e.g. to understand consequences of 
downstream supply problems on upstream delivery, to understand time dynamics, to 
estimate risk of no or late supply). Not only do models provide a means of quantifying 
risks and/or measuring their effects, but many models have the capability of capturing 
the systemic effects we might expect in a supply chain (for example, exposure to 
common environmental factors, single supplier, international regulation). The simple 
risk identification methods such as FMEA and reporting mechanisms such as Risk 
Registers represent only independent risks and fail to capture dependencies that will 
exist within the system that is the supply chain. Consequently, the coverage of all 
potential risks will be incomplete and estimates of the impact of risks will be 
conservative. In addition, the shortcomings of risk calculations based on measures such 
as the Risk Priority Number, commonly used in FMEA and Risk Registers, are well 
known. However, more sophisticated models, such as Bayesian Networks, can provide 
more accurate estimates of risk by using inference grounded in sound theory.   
 
Evaluation of alternative models for systemic risk 
In this section we explore the different types of models that can be used to support risk 
analysis. In particular we explain how these methods capture the systemic nature of 
risks. The managerial decisions to be supported may involve the assessment of the one-
off (re)design of a supply network or they may be part of an on-going process. The 
purpose of these models may be estimate the chance of occurrence of events (failures or 
their consequences) - usually by capturing logical inter-dependencies between variables 
– and/or to examine effects of adverse events on the performance of the supply network 
– often by replicating the physical flow of network. 
The models selected in Table 2 all have relevance to risk analysis in context of 
supply networks. Some models (e.g. FMEA, FT/ET) are well established within the 
quantitative risk assessment tool set, while others (e.g. DES, SD) are well known for 
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modelling supply chains. There are newer modelling technologies emerging (e.g. BBN, 
DBN) for which we now have the computing power to apply theory which has existed 
for some time (e.g. Bayes). Such models are finding applications in difference areas of 
risk analysis, including supply chains. Table 2 describes the relationship of these 
models to the purposes described above, stating their key assumption and provides 
references to selected relevant literature.  
 
 
  
Table 2 – Characteristics of modelling approaches 
Modelling 
approach 
Level of study Practical use in supply 
chain study 
Previous research  in supply 
chain risk 
Discrete event 
simulation. 
(DES models 
are usually 
stochastic.) 
Focus on the 
short-to-
medium term 
operational 
level of 
decision 
making 
Shows the effects of 
managerial interventions on 
system performance. 
 
Can be used to model supply 
chain processes at the 
operational level. 
 
 Swaminathan et al (1998) 
 Saad and Kadirkamanathan 
(2006) 
 Kull and Closs (2008) 
 
System 
dynamics / 
continuous 
simulation. 
(SD models are 
usually 
deterministic.) 
Focus on the 
longer-term 
strategic level 
of decision 
making 
Shows the effects of 
managerial interventions on 
system performance. 
 
Can be used to model the 
dynamic effects of (more or 
less complex) feedback loops 
on system performance. 
 
 Chan and Chan (2006)  
 Helo (2000) 
 Wilson (2007) 
 Thongrattana and Robertson 
(2008) 
 Oehmen (2009) 
 
 
Fault trees 
(FT) and event 
trees (ET). 
 
Failure modes 
and effects 
analysis 
(FMEA). 
Focus on 
operational 
details. 
Basic tools for risk 
assessment. 
 Sinha et al. (2004) 
 Welborn (2007) 
 Trucco et al.(2008) 
 Kumar (2009) 
 
Bayesian belief 
networks 
(BBN). 
 
Dynamic 
Bayesian 
networks 
(DBN). 
All levels of 
decision 
making 
Can be used to model both 
causes and effects of supply 
chain disruptions, where 
potentially adverse events are 
interlinked and 
interdependent. 
 
 Nairn et al. (2002) 
 Pai et al. (2003)  
 Neil et al. (2005)  
 Kao et al. (2005)  
 Chin (2009) 
 Lee (2009)  
 Lockamy (2010)  
 Deleris and Erhun (2011) 
 
Scenario 
planning. 
Focus on the 
(very) long-
term strategic 
level of 
decision 
making 
  Van der Heijden (2005) 
 
It is clear that all models are not equally appropriate for analysing supply chain risks.  
For example, the classical risk tools of FMEA and FT/ET are naive and so will miss 
important dependencies leading to an underestimation of risks. FMEA is an established 
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method for exploring the entire sample space of risks in a systematic manner. However, 
the very structure of the FMEA process is that it only allows for independent and 
mutually exclusive events. To compensate for the statistical assumptions of 
independence in Fault Trees, it is possible to include so-called common cause failures 
and to estimate their chance of occurrence through some other stochastic model, usually 
a shock process. While this may provide a better statistical estimate of the risk, the 
process of arriving at this estimate tends not to be transparent. It is also possible to 
develop Dynamic Fault Trees to capture the changing profiles of system over time; 
however, such temporal changes tend to be related to discrete mission changes rather 
than a continuous, real-time process.  
BBN, and increasingly DBN, have the ability to model system risks in the same way 
as a FT/ET, but they allow dependencies to be captured explicitly. While basic BBN are 
static models, DBN allow temporal relationships to be modelled, although again 
arguably by identifying suitable discrete time-slices that support requisite modelling.  
While BBN provide a means of representing uncertainty in the parameters of the 
model and hence estimates of the probability of events, we argue that they are less able 
to cope with complex supply network structures than, for example, SD. SD, together 
with DES, provide useful simulation modelling approaches to understanding the effects 
of events of that might impact the supply flow, although we argue that SD has the 
ability to capture more complex dependencies between events. This capability to 
capture complexity better than alternative models such as BBN comes at the cost of 
modelling the system deterministically rather than stochastically.  
Both BBN and SD approaches can be embedded within a modelling process that 
emphasizes the importance of model structuring as well as model quantification.  
Through the model structuring phase, stakeholders will be required to explore and 
identify potential risk events. However such exploration will usually be bounded by the 
agreed definition of the system under study. For example, the particular supply chain 
designs under consideration and a statement of the market in which operations will be 
run for the foreseeable future. In this sense we believe that BBN provides a useful 
approach for exploring the unknown future events that we are able to anticipate through 
rational analysis of the defined supply network configuration and operational 
environment.  
 
Table 3 – Suitability of different modelling approaches  
 Actual outcome of the event 
Known 
(deterministic) 
Unknown 
(stochastic; 
inherently uncertain) 
 
Potential occurrence 
of an adverse event 
Known System dynamics Discrete event simulation; 
(Dynamic) Bayesian belief 
network 
Unknown 
 
Cognitive mapping? Scenario planning 
 
That is, BBN can be positioned primarily in the ‘known-unknown’ category of Table 
3 (showing relationship between anticipated and realised risks). Both SD and BBN 
models can be represented graphically and can be developed by simple causal mapping 
and it is possible to use such models to explore alternative scenarios (e.g. supply 
designs, changing environments) to understand relative risks. Scenario planning is a 
natural qualitative tool for exploring strategic futures and hence thinking though risks 
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associated with changes in the system assumptions by deliberately challenging these 
assumptions. In this sense, Scenario planning provides a mechanism for exploring (as 
far as one reasonably can) the ‘unknown-unknowns’ in Table 3.  
 
Brief report of an exploratory case study 
Over the last 18 months, we have been conducting a pilot case study with the 
management of a public-sector organisation in charge of implementing a large new 
distribution network for hospital medicines. The initial phase of this study (covering 
about 9 months) was concerned with the implementation of a centralised distribution 
network that formed a radical break from the previous decentralised form of 
organisation. This implementation project was characterised by high levels of both 
complexity (mainly because of the complexity of the distribution network and the large 
number of key stakeholders involved) and uncertainty (mainly because of the advanced 
nature of the robotics and surrounding technology and its large scale of 
implementation). 
From a risk perspective, the key management tool before and during this phase was 
the use of detailed risk registers, as is common – and indeed often mandated – in these 
kinds of large and complex projects. However, according to our analysis, these risk 
registers have only been partially effective at best. As we have argued already, 
modelling should try to capture the essentially systemic nature of many risks, which risk 
registers often fail to do effectively. But in addition, this particular project offered a 
vivid example of the potentially crucial role of ‘unknown-unknowns’ – that is, those 
events that could hardly have been foreseen at the outset and that, even if one could 
conceive of them in principle, might not amenable to any kind of systematic estimation 
of probabilities. 
 The subsequent phase of our study, which is still on-going, is focusing on the move 
towards the routine operation of the new distribution network. In this phase, we are 
exploring the feasibility of a BBN modelling approach to complement the risk registers. 
Based on process maps we developed earlier, we aim to complete interviews with all 
relevant stakeholders, using a protocol informed by our selected BBN model principles, 
in order to qualitatively identify and structure the risks and the dependencies between 
them. We shall evaluate the BBN model in comparison with the risk register approach 
currently used. Note that this evaluation will focus on the process of identification and 
the understanding generated through model structuring and instantiation, but will not 
include a comparison of predictive ability. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have aimed to increase awareness of, and provide approaches to, 
modelling systemic risks in supply chains and so address a gap identified in the 
literature. We have drawn on the existing theory of BBN and risk management, and 
identified a pilot case study in which these ideas are applied. In the longer term, we 
would intend that such a model might provide a tool for more effective management of 
supply chain risk. 
 
References 
Ackermann, F., Eden, C., Williams, T. and Howick, S. (2007) Systemic risk assessment: a case study. 
The Journal of the Operational Research Society, 58, pp 39. 
Helo, P. T. (2000) Dynamic modelling of surge effect and capacity limitation in supply chains. 
International Journal of Production Research, 38, pp 4521-4533. 
Juettner, U., Peck H. and Christopher. M. (2003) Supply Chain Risk Management: Outlining an Agenda 
for Future Research, International Journal of Logistics: Research and Applications, 6, No. 4. 
8 
 
Kao, H. Y., Huang, C. H. and Li, H. L. (2005) Supply chain diagnostics with dynamic Bayesian 
networks. Computers & Industrial Engineering, 49, pp 339-347. 
Kull, T. and Closs, D. (2008) The risk of second-tier supplier failures in serial supply chains: Implications 
for order policies and distributor autonomy. European Journal of Operational Research, 186, pp 
1158-1174. 
Mitchell G. (1993), The Practice of Operational Research, Chichester: Wiley. 
Neil, M., Fenton, N. and Tailor, M. (2005) Using Bayesian networks to model expected and unexpected 
operational losses. Risk analysis, 25, pp 963-972. 
Pai, R. R., Kaflepalh, V. R., Caudill, R. J. and Zhou, M. C. (2003) Methods toward supply chain risk 
analysis. 2003 Ieee International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Vols 1-5, Conference 
Proceedings, pp 4560-4565. 
Phillips L.D. (1984), A theory of requisite decision models, Acta Psychologica 56, pp. 29-48. 
Saad, N. and Kadirkamanathan, V. (2006) A DES approach for the contextual load modelling of supply 
chain system for instability analysis. Simulation Modelling Practice and Theory, 14, pp 541-563. 
Swaminathan, J. M., Smith, S. F. and Sadeh, N. M. (1998) Modeling supply chain dynamics: A 
multiagent approach. Decision Sciences, 29, pp 607-632. 
Thongrattana, P. T. and Robertson, P. W. (2008) The impact of uncertain environment on rice supply 
chain performance in northeast Thailand, The IEEE international conference on industrial 
engineering and engineering management Singapore. 
Trkman P. and McCormack K (2009) Supply chain risk in turbulent environments – a conceptual model 
for managing supply chain network risk, International Journal of Production Economics 119, 247-
258. 
Van der Heijden, K. (2005) Scenarios – the art of strategic conversation, 2nd edition, John Wiley & Sons, 
Ltd. 
Williams, T. (2008) Management science in practice, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Wilson, M. C. (2007) The impact of transportation disruptions on supply chain performance. 
Transportation research part E, 43, pp 295-320. 
 
